Fielmann: taking affordable, customer-centric optical retail global

Fielmann Group is a family-owned business that is the market leader in optical retail in its home market of Germany and now the third largest optical retailer globally. Fielmann serves over 29m customers from more than 1,200 retail stores worldwide.

The optical industry has attractive economic characteristics with long-term growth tailwinds due to demographic ageing, low levels of cyclicality, a product that is both medical device and fashion accessory, and one that is highly customized. Fielmann holds a formidable market position in its core central European market based on its radical customer centricity, price leadership and scale.

The company’s founder, Günther Fielmann, made customer satisfaction the north star of the business, captured in the phrase “you are the customer” and that focus continues under second generation CEO, Marc Fielmann. Fielmann’s staff are trained to advise customers as if they were a member of the family, helping them to get the best value for money. Fielmann offers value for money, fair and transparent prices, and three year warranties on its products, helping to drive customer satisfaction ratings of over 90%, which is a key metric in management's compensation. This customer centricity drives loyalty, repeat purchase behaviour and ultimately volume.

Part of that customer-first proposition is affordable prices for high-quality and fashionable eyewear. Fielmann’s market share in Germany is 55% by volume, but less than 25% by revenue, given prices that are less than half of its competitors on average. Yet given store productivity levels far above the industry it maintains gross margins of 80% and EBITDA margins above 20%. Barriers to entry in the optical retail industry are relatively low, but taking share from Fielmann is a tougher challenge without sacrificing margins and returns on capital.

Fielmann’s stock suffered a major decline in 2021 and 2022 when the company’s international expansion and digitization efforts coincided with a weak German economy and surging wage inflation. Fielmann’s operating margin declined from 18% in 2018 to 10% by 2022 with the stock falling by more than half from its peak. The stock continues to trade in the low EUR 40’s, or approximately 14x our estimated adjusted EPS of EUR 2.9 for 2026 (excluding acquired intangibles amortization) and a similar level of FCF per share. These multiples are a very significant discount to industry peers and the company’s own history.

We believe part of the share price discount is due to skepticism around the company’s ambitious US expansion plans, which seeks to triple its US revenue from around US$300m in 2025 to US$1bn by 2030 via rapid organic roll out and further M&A. As of 2025 Fielmann had established a beachhead in the world’s largest optical market via two acquisitions from which it plans to scale to become a top 10 retailer. Fielmann may not yet command the same market share, scale or price leadership in the US that it enjoys in central Europe, but the strengths of Fielmann's customer centric model apply all the same. Fielmann has identified the opportunity to provide its affordable private label eyewear range at low or zero copay to insured customers, while earning potentially even higher margins than in its domestic market given insurance cover provides higher average order values and shorter replacement cycles.

Given the stock’s attractive valuation, the strong appeal of Fielmann’s customer centric business model and the significant opportunities for growth, we believe there is substantial up-side to the stock price over the coming three to five years.

The Eyewear Industry

We have discussed in previous posts how the eyewear industry demonstrates attractive economic characteristics, with structural long-term demand growth, low sensitivity to economic conditions, and a product that is both a medical necessity and a desirable fashion accessory. Deterioration of vision is a nearly universal phenomenon, beginning around the age of 40, and with an ageing global population the demand for vision correction will continue to grow for decades to come. Younger people are also developing myopia with increasing frequency due to more time spent indoors using devices, likely needing vision correction for longer than earlier generations.

Clear vision is absolutely essential to our daily lives and therefore a “must have”. Anyone who relies on prescription glasses will recall the sense of panic when they realize they've left the house without them! Possibly it's the only personal item that can create that same sense of panic besides the smartphone.

And while we need our glasses, we also want our glasses to make us look good. Attractive eyewear is an item of self-expression, identity, style and status.

This cross between a necessary medical device and fashion accessory drives significant pricing power and repeat purchase behavior. That pricing power is supported in a number of markets, such as the US, from health insurance reimbursement benefits that reduce the out-of-pocket cost to the consumer. Prescription eyewear is also highly customized and also requires an in-person eye exam and fitting, with the final product comprising several elements from frames to lenses and lens coatings with significant psychological pressure to purchase glasses in the same store as the initial eye exam. All of these elements make it difficult to do price comparisons and protects the industry from pure on-line competition.

This pricing power allows the industry to earn attractive margins and returns on capital but also creates a pricing umbrella that allows providers of less expensive glasses to flourish.

Prescription glasses are also a product where the pace of technological change is relatively slow. The advent of smart glasses notwithstanding (and addressed further below), the core competencies of frame design and manufacturing, eye refraction, lens grinding and edging tend to evolve at a moderate pace reducing the risk of sudden product obsolescence. It seems highly likely that prescription glasses will continue to be an essential product for billions of people for decades to come.

Fielmann Group AG

Fielmann has developed an optical retail model that provides exceptional value to customers, creating high customer satisfaction and retention, while maintaining strong profitability. Low prices, satisfied clients and solid profit margins help to create a wide economic moat. 

Fielmann Group is the third largest eyewear business globally occupying a formidable competitive position in its core markets of Germany, Switzerland and Austria due to its high quality, stylish, yet affordable prescription glasses. The company is 73% owned by the Fielmann family and is run by the second generation, CEO Marc Fielmann, who has led the company to modernize, digitize and is growing the company’s presence into Spain, Poland and the US.

Company founder, Günther Fielmann, opened his first optical store in Cuxhaven in 1972. Germany’s post-war state health insurance system provided only a limited range of unattractive glasses for those with particularly severe vision correction needs. For those on lower incomes and unable to afford the purchase of expensive prescription glasses, state health insurance models were the only option. Günther Fielmann noted that wearers of state insurance glasses were forced to display their low-income status on their faces.

“Kassenbrille” State Insurance Glasses

Source: Fielmann Group

In the early 1980’s Fielmann signed an agreement with the local AOK health insurance fund (a provider of statutory medical insurance) in the town of Esens, agreeing to provide AOK’s members with 90 different frames at zero out-of-pocket cost (‘Nulltarif’) to customers. His move to offer lower pricing generated substantial push back from the optical industry. Over time, however, all major health insurance providers signed up to this scheme helping Fielmann to become Germany’s largest glasses retailer, a position it maintains through a relentless focus on affordable prices and strong customer satisfaction. After expanding to East Germany in the early 1990s the company went public in 1994, with the family retaining over 70% of the shares.

Company Founder: Günther Fielmann

Source: Fielmann Group

Germany remains the company’s largest market generating EUR 1.43bn in revenue in 2024 (60% of group), selling 6.7m pairs of glasses annually or 56% of all glasses sold in the country, from its 626 stores, but at prices that are on average half of that of its competitors (its revenue share is just 24%). Fielmann maintains price leadership in Germany while keeping its customer satisfaction rates over 90% and generating EBITDA margins above 20%.

Its low average prices do not reflect poor quality or a lack of style as Fielmann’s private label range offers a wide assortment of high-quality, fashionable frames designed in-house while offering extended three-year warranties. Fielmann’s private label range makes up around 70% of sales in Germany, at higher margins than on sales of branded eyewear. While its glasses are inexpensive, Fielmann’s carefully-curated image is anything but cheap.

Fielmann Store

Source: Fielmann Group

While a “customer first” approach has become dogma among corporates, Fielmann is one of the few to authentically pursue it. The message from the top is that customers should be advised as if they were family, ensuring they get the best deal. In a recent interview at the Swiss Economic Forum, Marc Fielmann emphasized the importance of treating customers with even the smallest budgets fairly, with the view that satisfied customers will ultimately be profitable customers. This was a founding principle of the business passed down from Marc’s father. The company’s CFO is on record saying they will never sacrifice customer satisfaction for margins and compensation for senior executives is linked to the maintenance of high customer satisfaction ratings.

Despite selling at prices that its competitors cannot match Fielmann generates a gross margin of nearly 79% and an EBITDA margin of nearly 22% in its core German market. The key to these very attractive margins is store productivity, vertical integration and scale. The group’s central European stores generate between five and ten times the revenue of an average optician and its flagship megastores in key cities generate revenue of up to EUR 20m per store. In Germany its revenue per store was EUR 2.47m in 2024, roughly 2.5x what an average optical store sells in the US[1] on much higher prices. Its store turnover is extraordinary, selling approximately 10,800 pairs per store per year, or nearly 30 pairs per day.

Fielmann's ability to sell a high-quality product at attractive prices while maintaining excellent profitability represents a formidable barrier to competition. Its nearest German competitor, Apollo Optik (a subsidiary of industry behemoth, EssilorLuxottica), generated a third less revenue despite having a 45% higher store count as of 2020, the latest public data available before the company was acquired). And over the past several years Fielmann has continued to gain modest market share, holding volumes flat despite an overall decline in market volumes of 7.5% since a peak in 2019 as the German economy has struggled and consumer sentiment has been weak. Fielmann’s value offering benefits in a weaker economy as consumers look to save money, which has helped drive share gains given the headwinds to the German economy since COVID and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Fielman in fact cut prices in 2022 in order to drive volume growth, driving 4ppts of share gains over the subsequent two years (although it took a temporary hit to margins). Overall, despite a stagnant market, Fielmann’s German revenues grew 3.6% p.a. over the five years to 2024 due to broadly stable volumes, and higher average order value – mostly on improved mix of higher value and progressive lenses.

The German economy appears poised to pick up starting in 2026 given the effects of fiscal stimulus that started to flow by late 2025, which could be a tailwind to consumer sentiment, but the company is not relying on a better economy to drive growth. Management expects German revenue growth to continue at around 4-5%, with volumes increasing around 1% and pricing driven by sell out structure or mix, with a rising contribution of higher-value lenses (higher refraction materials), and growing the share of progressive lenses, whose share has been rising by around 1ppt per year. Penetration of progressive lenses across Fielmann’s customer base is approximately 50% below that of the comparable population, which the company attributes to its value-focused approach and younger sales staff who tend to undersell progressive lenses even when they are the right solution for the customer, leaving a significant untapped profit pool.

German stores are already extremely productive, but suffer from capacity constraints, which the company is seeking to solve. Walk in customers often find the stores extremely busy and are unable to get an appointment and by registering customers as they enter a store Fielmann knows they lose hundreds of thousands of customers per year before someone is able to serve them. Fielmann has several projects underway to address that unmet demand.

Firstly, Fielmann piloted a new store planning software, Store.ai, which utilizes AI to predict demand and automatically optimize staffing schedules to match that expected demand and minimize appointment wait times. Pilot stores have seen a significant 5-7 incremental unit sales per day, and the company is now rolling out the software across its entire store network, but is conservatively estimating just one additional pair per store per day. Even this conservative increase would drive significant earnings uplift given high incremental margins [2].

Secondly, eye refractions typically take around 15 minutes, but new automated refraction machines can reduce that time by around 3-4 minutes and allow one optician to assist multiple customers simultaneously. This should increase the number of available appointments and customers served.

Third, Fielmann is rolling out a smaller store format that reduces up-front store capex and will allow faster and lower cost new store expansion in Germany.

Switzerland and Austria are Fielmann’s other core European markets but are much smaller markets at just over 1m pairs per year in total, with Fielmann’s volume share at 45% and 34% respectively. Private insurance coverage and high pricing in Switzerland supports a very profitable operation. Fielmann’s revenue share from Switzerland is only 20% (EUR 228m) versus nearly 50% volume share. But with revenue per pair of EUR 513, given Switzerland’s high prices (nearly 80% of the population has supplemental health insurance), its Swiss stores generate revenue of over EUR 5m each and Switzerland contributes EUR 65m in EBITDA with a margin of nearly 29%.

Despite being similar in overall size to Switzerland, Fielmann’s market share in Austria is smaller and pricing is more constrained, generating just EUR 100m in revenue in 2024 and EUR 19m in EBITDA.

Manufacturing, Supply Chain and Logistics

While not vertically integrated to the same extent as EssilorLuxottica, Fielmann leverages its scale (likely over 14m pairs of glasses sold in 2024 including its recent US acquisitions) to drive purchasing volume discounts on lenses and frames. It sources most of its semi-finished lens blanks from major suppliers such as Zeiss, Essilor and Hoya, which are then surfaced, coated and edge mounted in the company’s own central hubs in Rathenow (new Brandenburg), Chumtov (Czechia) and Dayang (China), and its optical labs in Bilbao, Green Bay and Detroit. Fielmann’s Rathenow facility has the capacity to produce and ship 4.5m lenses and glasses pairs, while the new facility in Chumtov has an initial capacity of 2.5m pairs, with room to grow to 8m pairs over time. For some products Fielmann sources pressed polymer from SE Asia and India to manufacture its own lens blanks.

Fielmann designs its private label frames in house, but the frames themselves are sourced from external suppliers in South East Asia and Italy given the cost of the frames is usually only EUR 3-4, with minimal value added in the manufacturing process.

Vision 2025: Fielmann Goes Global

Until 2019 Fielmann was managed by founder and CEO, Günther Fielmann, in a very conservative fashion with a net cash balance sheet (reaching over EUR 300m) and paying out more than 90% of earnings as dividends. It retained its focus on its core central European markets despite limited growth opportunities, but grew its dividend every single year, including through the financial crisis. Returns on capital and returns on equity were around 25%, with ROIC of 18-19% (adjusted for capitalization of leases). This conservative management approach and consistent results attracted a cohort of loyal German retail investors causing the stock to trade at a premium valuation.

After eight years in the firm, Marc Fielmann joined his father as co-CEO in 2018 and took over as CEO in late 2019 upon his father’s retirement. The elder Fielmann passed away in early 2024.

In 2019 the company embarked on its “Vision 2025” strategy to modernize, digitize and internationalize. The Vision 2025 goals included a revenue target of EUR 2.5bn, an adjusted EBITDA margin goal of 24-25%, and continued customer satisfaction ratings above 90%, which the company appeared on track to deliver as of its 9M25 results.  

The Vision 2025 plan marked a departure from the company’s conservative past but was necessary as the eyewear industry consolidates and digital channels play a growing role in the purchase journey. Significant investments were made in digital infrastructure to drive Fielmann’s omnichannel strategy, upgrade manufacturing and logistics, and expand internationally, both organically and via acquisition.

After a false start in Italy, Fielmann’s expansion into Spain has proved more successful. In 2020 Fielmann acquired an 80% interest in Barcelona-based Optica & Audiologia Universitaria for EUR 185m, and in 2022 it added Medical Optica Audicion in for EUR 71m, making Fielmann the number two optical chain in Spain. As of 2024 it operated 126 stores in the country under the two banners, selling 0.6m pairs or 10% share by volume, with revenue of EUR 193m growing around 10%, at an EBITDA margin of 21.9%. The Spanish operation continues to see strong revenue momentum due to both like-for-like sales growth and new stores. Fielmann acquired the remaining 20% of Optica in 2024 and plans to grow its Spanish footprint to over 200 stores over the medium term.

Expansion into North America

In 2023 Fielmann entered the US market with the EUR 102m acquisition of SVS Vision in Michigan with its 82 stores, at the same time acquiring online eyewear retailer and vision insurance platform, Befitting, for EUR 28m. In mid-2024 Fielmann added to its US presence with the acquisition of Shopko Optical in Wisconsin for EUR 275m, consolidating Shopko’s 144 stores across 13 mid-western states.

While multiples weren’t disclosed on the SVS acquisition, estimates suggest both transactions were done at around 8.5x EBITDA, a similar level to Fielmann’s own multiple at the time. While not outright cheap, these multiples seem reasonable in order to establish a scaled beachhead in the US. By the end of 2025 Fielmann could boast a market leading position in the upper Midwest region with 226 stores across the two retail banners, on track to generate EUR 280m in revenue with a mid-teens EBITDA margin. While margin expectations for the US have been adjusted lower for 2025 from an initial target of 19% due to slower organic revenue growth, management still believes that 19% level is achievable in 2026 and expects US profitability to ultimately close the gap with the 25% in Europe.

Coming from Germany’s largely uninsured and value-focused market, it is easy to see the attraction of the US market for Fielmann. It is the world’s largest optical market by revenue, with a relatively fragmented retail landscape, while pricing for prescription glasses benefits from broad private insurance coverage. US consumers also tend to replace their glasses every two years, compared to once every three years in Europe, which means new stores have a shorter path to profitability.

As of 2024 there were around 44 thousand optical retail locations in the US[3], with 16.5 thousand of those stores owned by the largest 50 retail chains and 13.7 thousand owned by the top 10. Essilor and its franchise network, Vision Source, together accounted for a little over 5,000 stores. That still leaves around 27.5k smaller chains and independent outlets that offer opportunities for consolidation. This is a much lower rate of consolidation than in Fielmann’s European markets.

Fielmann also believes there is a significant opportunity in the US to offer its extensive, affordable private label eyewear range at low or zero out-of-pocket cost to insured customers, while still generating attractive margins. In other words, it seeks to replicate some of the advantages of its original “nulltarif” glasses in Germany. Rolling out its private label range this year, Fielmann’s US banners will go from offering fewer than 40 zero copay frames and lens options to more than 1500.

And the level of vision insurance reimbursement should provide Fielmann with the opportunity to earn attractive margins. Most vision insurance plans in the US typically have an annual allowance system for frames (say up to $150), and set copays for eye exams, lenses and lens coatings. While the actual level of reimbursement is complicated by the specific lens prescription, choice of lens material, lens coatings chosen and frames selection, some estimates put the average insurance reimbursement at around $200[4]. According to Vision Service Plan, the largest vision insurance provider, a pair of affordable, single lens prescription glasses with only one optional coating (scratch-resistance) is estimated to cost $288 without insurance, or $42 with VSP coverage, an insurance contribution of $246. This excludes an eye exam.

Source: visioncare.vsp.com/Eye-on-cost/quiz/results-820PJ-17997AN.html, as at 13 Jan 2026

Even taking a highly conservative figure of $100 as the estimated insurance reimbursement (excluding the eye exam), this would still provide a pricing level at which Fielmann can generate attractive margins (according to the company’s IR, that level of pricing would still be above the pricing “sweet spot” for an equivalent pair of private label glasses in its German home market of around EUR 35-40).

The key is navigating the complexities of the US vision insurance model, and being an “in network” for insured customers is a critical factor for success. Roughly two-thirds of US adults, or 170m people, benefit from some level of commercial vision insurance[5]. That insurance cover is dominated Vision Service Plan (‘VSP’), with 80m members, both individual direct and via corporate plans, while EyeMed (owned by Essilor) and Versant Health cover another 50m and 35m people respectively, the latter through its Superior Vision and Davis Vision brands. The other point to note is that general health insurance in Fielmann’s core markets is highly concentrated. In Michigan Blue Cross Blue Shield’s share of all plan types is over 65%[6], while Illinois is similarly concentrated with Health Care Services Corp (HCSC) operating at Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois, holding 62%.

According to their respective websites both the Shopko Optical and SVS Vision banners are “in network” for most VSP, Davis and Superior Vision plan members, as well as BCBS Michigan and UnitedHealth in Wisconsin, suggesting that Fielmann’s stores do already benefit from being "in network" for most insured customers in its target regions.

Fielmann's acquisition of the Befitting platform is also a key link between its retail stores and the insurance providers. Prior to the acquisition Befitting had worked closely with the vision insurance providers to develop APIs that can assess a member's specific vision benefits to determine pricing and out-of-pocket costs for various eyewear options in real time. In most optical stores the pricing and level of reimbursement is only fixed at the end of the purchase process once frames, lenses and coatings have been selected and insurance benefits assessed. Sales staff in Fielmann’s stores, however, will be equipped with a tablet that includes the Befitting application and staff should therefore be able to provide accurate pricing and out-of-pocket costs on the spot as the customer selects frames, lenses and coatings.

As of early 2026 the three US acquisitions have been successfully integrated, with one ERP system, a single head office and targeted cost synergies realized. The integration now moves to Phase 2 where they seek to change the customer-facing side of the business by introducing Fielmann's full private label assortment, introducing new format pilot stores in 1H26, and finalizing which retail banner to continue under going forward. Fielmann's US management is also focused on optimizing processes in existing stores to improve optometrist availability, reduce eye exam wait times, and improve same-day conversion of eye exams to in-store purchase. In other words, 2026 marks something of a transition year, and success should be judged by the level of like-for-like sales growth from existing stores toward the back half of the year.

Vision 2025 Achieved

While yet to report for the full year 2025 Fielmann should come very close to achieving its Vision 2025 goals of EUR 2.5bn in revenue and a 24% EBITDA margin. In the nine months to September Fielmann reported consolidated revenue of EUR 1.84bn (up 9% and 4% organically), with an adjusted EBITDA margin of 23.6%. Fielmann’s European operations improved its EBITDA margin by 1.7ppts y/y to 24.8%, while the US made reasonable progress to 13.9%.

The one thing Vision 2025 did not deliver was strong shareholder returns as the stock has yet to fully recover from the sharp falls of 2021 and 2022, languishing in the low EUR 40’s. The Vision 2025 plan required investment and combined with pressure on wages in its home market, Fielmann’s operating margin fell from around 18% in 2016 to just under 10% in 2022 (adjusted for acquired intangibles amortization). EPS declined by 25% in 2022 and the company cut the dividend to 75c (from EUR 1.90 in 2019) in order to fund its growth. The result was a significant decline in the share price from over EUR 70 in early 2021 to just EUR 30 by late 2022.

After a brief rally in 2025, the stock continues to trade in the low-40’s as of early 2026, putting the shares on around 14x FY26 adjusted EPS (adjusted for amortization of acquired intangibles) – a very significant discount to peers and its own history. The median of peers stands at 25x. The stock rose sharply in early 2025 well when it became clear the business was on track to deliver significant margin improvements towards the 2025 target. The stock retraced its gains, however, on slower organic growth in the US (4%) and Germany (2%) in the middle of the year. The market's concern is that US integration is proving slower and causing more disruption than anticipated.

We believe these teething issues are addressable and that based on the discounted valuation alone there is substantial up-side to the stock price.

Near-term peer valuation multiples suggest the stock to be worth around EUR 78, based on 12x 2026 EBITDA (the low end of peer multiples) of approximately EUR 600m, less net debt of EUR 640m (~1.1x 2026 EBITDA). That would also put the stock on 27x adj EPS and a similar multiple of FCF, still below the company’s long-run average multiple and similar to peers. Our DCF-based valuation arrives at a similar share price, assuming a WACC of 6.9%, long-term growth of 2% and long-term capital structure comprised of 15% debt to total capital.

A near doubling in the stock price over 2-3 years would be sufficiently attractive for us, but Fielmann has greater ambitions over the next five years and there could be more up-side to the share price if it is able to achieve those targets.

Vision 2035

In mid-2025 Fielmann released a new medium-term plan called Vision 2035. Interim targets to 2030 include revenue of EUR 4bn (a revenue CAGR or 10%), with a broadly relatively stable EBITDA margin target of 25%.

Fielmann Targets to 2030

Source: Fielmann Group, Capital Markets Day, November 2025

On peer average EV/EBITDA multiples of 12x, EUR 1bn in EBITDA would represent an enterprise value of EUR 12bn, and assuming net debt of EUR 1.5bn (1.5x ND/EBITDA) in line with management’s more recent levels, the equity could be worth as much as EUR 10.5bn or EUR 125 per share, nearly 3x today’s price, and a ~25% annualized return including a five year average dividend per share of EUR 1.81.

But how realistic are Fielmann’s 2030 goals and what are the costs and risks associated with trying to achieve them?

The plan calls for EUR 500m in incremental revenue from core European optometry, or a 4.8% revenue CAGR, which appears reasonable given a history of 3-5% revenue growth even as the German economy has struggled over the past five years. German fiscal stimulus and better consumer sentiment could provide a lift in Fielmann’s core market. As outlined above, Fielmann also aims to drive store productivity through digital appointments, faster eye exam turnaround times, and increasing the mix of higher value progressive lens sales in its European stores. It also expects to generate faster growth in markets like Spain and Poland that are already demonstrating very strong growth. Total capex for the five years to 2030 is expected to be EUR 600m, slightly higher as a percent of sales relative to history given investments in tech, store expansion in Spain and investment in the Chumtov facility.

Fielmann aims to more than double audiology revenue from an estimated EUR 155m in 2025 to EUR 400m by 2030, which appears more ambitious. Audiology volumes and revenues have grown at a 9% and 14% CAGR respectively over the past seven years, and the 2030 targets imply a 19% 5-yr revenue CAGR. Around half of that growth is expected to come from an accelerated roll out of audiology practices within existing optical stores, at an 11% CAGR, with the rest driven by increased marketing and awareness, and operational improvements. Audiology is relatively low incremental cost and high-margin revenue (with higher price points than glasses).

An incremental EUR 100m is expected to be come from Fielmann’s tele-ophthalmology “Eye Health Check Up” service, developed by Switzerland-based Ocumeda. The Eye Health Check Up allows in-store opticians to perform comprehensive eye screenings with state-of-the-art equipment, with the results reviewed by off-site ophthalmologists. Fielmann conducted 88k eye health check ups across 593 stores in 1H25, up 230% y/y, and the goal is to do 440k by 2030 by extending the service beyond just the Fielmann store network. Given the efficiencies of this model and the ability to offer it beyond the Fielmann network to other industry players, we view these goals as quite achievable. Fielmann acquired 90% of Ocumeda in 2023 and recently sold a 10% stake to Zeiss Vision Care.

The largest contribution to the incremental revenue goal, however, comes from the US with a very ambitious plan to grow revenue from ~$300m in 2025 to ~$1bn by 2030, a revenue CAGR of 27%. This would put Fielmann among the top 10 optical retailers in the US.

While around half of the incremental $700m in revenue is expected to come via M&A (with $350m budgeted for acquisitions at a target 1x rev multiple), that still leaves a very heavy lift from store optimization, productivity, organic store roll out and “fill in” acquisitions. The 2030 plan indicates total US capex of $540m over the coming five years, leaving $190m for store refurbishments, new store rollouts and smaller acquisitions. Those efforts need to roughly double the $300m revenue base as of 2025, or a revenue CAGR of 17%. That will be a very challenging task given Fielmann is still in the process of deciding under which banner it will operate, rolling out its zero copay private label range, and converting its existing stores to the new model.

Fielmann’s existing 226 US stores generate approximately US$1.33m per store. Assuming 3% p.a. like-for-like growth, Fielmann would need to expand the store base by around 160 additional stores to achieve around ~US$600m in revenue by 2030 (excluding larger M&A). That store growth implies a significant opportunity exists for store network densification in Fielmann's upper mid-west target region. Like-for-like growth of 3% seems reasonably conservative given industry organic volume growth of 1-2% as well as pricing, mix and store productivity initiatives, but even assuming 4% like-for-like growth Fielmann would likely still need to add at least 30 new stores per year. At a cost of around $500k per new store (and allowing some buffer above that), Fielmann is probably looking at ~$100m for new stores, which would then allow for $90m in store refurbishments and tuck-in deals. The good news is that new US stores have a faster path to profitability given a shorter, ~2 year repurchase period (an industry rule of thumb is that profitability takes one-and-a-half repurchase intervals). Nevertheless, margins will fluctuate somewhat near term and as many as 60-70 new stores would still be in the ramp up phase as of 2030.

A significant contribution to the target will come from larger acquisitions for which Fielmann is budgeting $350m, with a list of 10 targets already identified across its focus area of the upper Midwest, with EVs ranging between $5m to $60m. The goal is to pay 1x revenue (or 5x EBITDA) multiples although they paid slightly above that for the first two transactions.

VisionMonday’s top 50 US optical retailers list for 2024 shows eight optical chains focused on the upper Midwest with around 130 stores and $180m in revenue, so management must have visibility into other opportunities outside of the larger chains, or have a wider geographic footprint in mind to get to $350m. We also don’t expect there to be any large deals this year given the need to bed down the new operating model and ramp up organic growth from the current store base.

Our conclusion is that the $1bn US revenue target by 2030 is possible but depends on the room for adding more stores without cannibalizing the existing base, and may end up relying more on M&A with some greater geographic flexibility. As long as it remains disciplined with its acquisition multiples, however, this remains a reasonable goal.

It will be a period of heavy investment, which will weigh on free cash flow, but the existing business has the operating cash flow to support the investment. Fielmann typically converts 80% of EBITDA to operating cash flow and with Fielmann’s more mature European operations set to generate around EUR 2.9bn in EBITDA over the coming five years to 2030, less expected capex of around EUR 600m. That provides plenty of funding headroom for US expansion even after cumulative dividend payments of around EUR 900m. Fielmann's balance sheet is also strong with net debt/EBITDA declining to around 1.1x as of 3Q25 (net debt of EUR 640m vs expected FY25 EBITDA of around EUR 575m), well below management's comfort zone of up to 2x.

At a high level, we believe Fielmann's strategy to expand into the large, fragmented and insurance-subsidized US market makes sense. The market appears to offer the potential for attractive margins and returns on capital at significant scale. There are other optical retailers competing at the affordable end of the market, but none have Fielmann's existing scale, vertical integration and supply chain, customer focus and retailing expertise. If Fielmann can take a leading position in the affordable eyewear space in the US, it will drive further economies of scale and reinforce Fielmann's competitive edge globally.

Risks

The key risk for investors is that Fielmann's aggressive US expansion plans fail to generate the results that management expects given a structurally different market. Fielmann's private label product could be a poor match for US consumer tastes, or the demand for cheaper, zero-copay eyewear could be weaker than Fielmann expects given different consumer expectations. With a number of insurance providers also active in the optical retail market, there could be unexpected resistance to including Fielmann stores "in network" to prevent a new player taking significant share, at lower prices, and pressuring industry margins. This would see significant capital resources misallocated. We believe that risk is mitigated by the steps Fielmann has taken so far by achieving scale quickly, with the acquisition of Befitting, and by working closely with insurers. Fielmann does appear to have done its homework on the US market and we believe high-quality products, offered at an affordable price, are universally attractive to customers.

Fielmann's core German market also remains under pressure to due to a weakening industrial economy, which appears to create depressed sentiment around the stock. It is worth noting that Fielmann continued to grow revenue over the past several years despite existing economic headwinds and its pricing leadership makes it well placed to continue.

Technology has historically not played a strong role in eyewear, but the advent of AI-enabled smart glasses appears to be changing that. EssilorLuxottica is reportedly ramping up production capacity for its Meta Ray-Ban and Oakley smart glasses to 20m units by the end of 2026 given their surprising success. The other tech giants, Google and Apple, are entering the fray this year as well, with Google already partnered with one of Fielmann's US competitors, Warby Parker. Apple's ability to integrate glasses with its iPhone and its distribution capability would make it a formidable competitor. The ability to communicate with computing via voice has been the key that unlocks smart eyewear. At this stage our view is that these will be largely separate markets, with younger, tech-savvy consumers adopting smart glasses initially and older customers that require prescription glasses following later (if at all). Getting younger consumers to adopt eyewear at an earlier stage would likely expand the market as well. Fielmann already retails smart glasses so it benefits to some degree from this expansion in the addressable market, although presumably at lower margin than its highly profitable private label range.

The question is whether wider smart glasses adoption takes share from traditional glasses, and whether price subsidization by the tech giants nullifies Fielmann's pricing advantage (the tech giants could lower prices and profit from the masses of consumer data generated). This is something we are watching closely.

Conclusion

We view Fielmann's core competitive advantage as its relentless customer centricity, with high-quality, yet affordable glasses. It's share, scale and store productivity in Europe provide a broad economic moat, with strong returns and free cash flow. The key debate is whether those strengths can be exported to the US and whether Fielmann's substantial ongoing investment will generate sufficiently high returns. We believe that it can. At the current share price and valuation of around 14x P/E, 11x EV/EBIT and 7x EV/EBITDA we believe these risks are more than adequately discounted, with substantial up-side over 3-5 years if Fielmann proves successful.

[1] The average rev per store of 16,471 stores represented by the largest 50 optical retail chains was US$1.28m in 2024.

[2] EUR 180 in ASP across ~650 stores at an 80% incremental EBITDA margin drives EUR 33m in incremental EBITDA or a 2ppt lift to EBITDA margin.

[3] The Vision Council

[4] Foster Grant Blog Post: How Much Do Glasses Cost? | Foster Grant

[5] Source: Google AI Overview, 12 December 2025

[6] Competition in Health Insurance, A Comprehensive Study of U.S. Markets, 2025 Update, American Medical Association